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INTRODUCTION
Final-offer arbitration limits an arbitrator to choosing a
final offer made by one of the parties involved in an
arbitration proceeding.1 Conventional arbitration, on the
other hand, allows an arbitrator to make an unrestricted
settlement choice without the prior submission of offers by the
disputants.2
The most discussed use of final-offer arbitration is its
application in Major League Baseball (“MLB”) salary
1. The process was first proposed by Carl Stevens in 1966. See Carl Stevens, Is
Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5 INDUS. REL. 38 (1966).
2. D.L. Dickinson, A comparison of conventional, final-offer and “combined”
arbitration for dispute resolution, 57 INDUS.& LAB. REL. REV. 288, 289 (2004).
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arbitration. Because of its long-term presence and apparent
success, final-offer arbitration is sometimes referred to as
“Baseball Arbitration.”3 Major League Baseball is unique in
that final-offer arbitration is used solely to select a specific
salary that is then inserted into a players existing contract.4
But final-offer arbitration has also been utilized in other
contexts, such as public employment, a context in which finaloffer arbitration is sometimes codified to resolve bargaining
impasses.5 Although state statutes governing arbitration may
share certain goals, the execution of these public employment
statutes is inconsistent.
Final-offer arbitration is typically utilized in “interest”
arbitration. Interest arbitration involves submitting disputes
that arise from a disagreement over what terms or conditions
to include in an agreement. Public employment interest
arbitration involves the arbitration of disputed terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, such as wages or health
insurance benefits. Salary arbitration in MLB is a unique
form of interest arbitration in that it deals with a player’s
individual contract, rather than the terms of the league’s
collective bargaining agreement. This paper will analyze
final-offer interest arbitration in labor law in an effort to
understand the statutory inconsistencies and to explore how
and when final-offer arbitration may be best utilized.
Part II of this paper will discuss the theories underlying
final-offer arbitration and how these theories have led to the
use of such arbitration in both private and public sector labor
law. In order to determine the contexts in which final-offer
arbitration could be implemented, as well as the appropriate
procedural variation, this section will analyze several
agreements and statutes that have used or considered such
3. See ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 937 (2006).
4. See MLB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. VI (2007-2011)
[hereinafter
MLB
AGREEMENT],
available
at
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf.
5. Iowa and Washington have mandatory final-offer arbitration statutes. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 20.22 (Lexis 2008). WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.21.779 (Lexis 2008).
Other states have mandatory final-offer arbitration statutes if requested by one of the
parties. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A) (Lexis 2008). ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 26 § 965 (Lexis 2008). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5-276a(c) (Lexis 2008). MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179A.16 (Subd. 7) (Lexis 2008). OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. § 51-108(4) (Lexis 2008),
PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122-A (Lexis 2008), MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.238 (Lexis
2008), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4)(b) (Lexis 2008), N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (2009). ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN., 5 ILCS 315/14 (2009).
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arbitration. Additionally, Part II will address the interest
arbitration mandate of the proposed Employee Free Choice
Act and the suitability of final-offer arbitration in this
context.
Part III examines which factors a final-offer arbitrator
should be permitted to consider in making his or her
determination. Collective bargaining agreements and finaloffer arbitration statutes specifically dictate what an
arbitrator may consider in making his or her decision, and
some go as far as excluding specific criteria. The permitted
criteria are formulated to mimic the bargaining market
between the two parties in order to establish market value.
With that in mind, Part III will analyze how this list of
criteria should be structured in a final-offer setting.
II. IN WHAT CONTEXTS IS FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION MOST
APPROPRIATE?
A. The Theory Behind Final-Offer Arbitration
In order to understand the theory behind final-offer
arbitration, it is important to first look at the criticisms of
conventional arbitration. It is argued that conventional
arbitrators often “split the difference” between each party’s
position.6 Although the idea of a compromise itself may be
fair, the existence of a compromise can be seen as an obstacle
to good-faith bargaining, based on the assumption that these
compromises cause a “chilling” or “freezing” effect on
negotiations.7 Because parties may believe that the arbitrator
will split the difference, they may be less willing to make
concessions and more likely to take extreme positions so that
the arbitral “compromise” will be skewed in their favor.
Whether a conventional arbitrator actually splits the
difference has little impact on how the parties formulate their
offers. What is most important is that parties who expect
compromise tend to extend extreme offers and, as a result, fail
to reach a middle ground in pre-arbitration settlement
discussions. This would lead to more bargaining impasses
and, consequently, more arbitration hearings.
6. See RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 936.
7. Peter Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect, 14 INDUS. REL.
302, 304 (1975).
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The goal of final-offer arbitration is to counteract this
chilling effect.8 The theory is that by doing so, final-offer
arbitration promotes good faith bargaining and pre-hearing
settlement.9 When an arbitrator’s discretion is limited to a
choice between two final offers, each party may worry that if
his or her final offer is too extreme, an arbitrator will choose
the final offer of the opposing party. As a result, it is to the
strategic advantage of each party to present a final offer that
is closer to the middle than the opposition’s offer, since that
position should win out in arbitration. When each party feels
pressured to make a more reasonable offer, the parties are
brought together toward a middle ground, which promotes
settlement prior to an arbitration hearing. The idea of finaloffer arbitration is to avoid arbitral hearings altogether in
favor of an efficient, negotiated resolution. Although efficiency
may not necessarily be the stated priority of arbitration
generally, it is unequivocally the goal of final-offer
arbitration.
Although the purpose of final-offer arbitration is to avoid
an arbitration hearing, it is the presence of the final-offer
arbitration process that promotes good-faith bargaining and
drives the negotiations toward settlement, not the
negotiations themselves. Although the pre-hearing settlement
may be similar to the arbitrator’s ultimate decision, this is not
a zero-sum game. The parties not only save the time and
expense of a hearing, but also seek a compromise in order to
prevent the arbitrator from selecting the other party’s final
offer. The parties also benefit from avoiding the adversarial
nature of a lengthy hearing.
Professor Roger Abrams, referring to his experience as a
baseball arbitrator, notes that he looked for fair market value;
whichever offer was closest to his idea of market value would
win.10 In final-offer salary arbitration, the parties know that
one side might receive an award that is greater than market
value while the other party might receive below market value.
Thus, for risk-averse parties, there is an incentive to
compromise. Final-offer arbitration may be problematic if
both parties present unreasonable offers, but the incentive to
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ROGER ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY
ARBITRATION 155 (2000).
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extend a more reasonable offer typically outweighs the risk
associated with losing to an “unreasonable” offer. As Professor
Abrams noted, “[w]inning means being more reasonable,
which is the key that unlocks the door to settlement.”11
Major League Baseball’s salary arbitration is a highly
successful example of the sought-after benefits associated
with final-offer arbitration. In the 2009 salary arbitration
season,12 111 players filed for arbitration, 46 players
exchanged numbers with their respective teams, and only
three of these players continued to a hearing.13 The question
remains whether MLB’s success with final-offer arbitration is
an anomaly. How is final-offer arbitration applied in public
employment? Is its application appropriate? Can the process
be extended to other contexts that could benefit from the
advantages of final-offer arbitration? The sections that follow
will analyze these questions in an effort to determine the
most appropriate contexts for the use of final-offer arbitration.
B. Major League Baseball: Final-Offer Salary Arbitration
Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining process
utilizes final-offer arbitration for one issue only: determining
a player’s salary within the parameters of his existing
contract.14 A player is eligible for arbitration after completing
three to six years15 of major league service.16 After three
11. Id. at 153.
12. Major League Baseball’s “salary arbitration season” occurs in January and
February. Players file for arbitration in early to mid-January and negotiate with their
organization up until the potential hearings which take place between February 1st and
February 20th. In 2009, players filed for arbitration by January 15th and all hearings
were completed on February 20th as required by the league’s collective bargaining
agreement. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(5).
13. Maury Brown, 2009 MLB Salary Arbitration Vital Statistics, THE BIZ OF
BASEBALL,
Feb.
20,
2009,
http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2974:2009mlb-salary-arbitration-vital-stats&catid=66:free-agnecy-and-trades&Itemid=153.
14. Sports unions are run much differently than other labor unions. In labor law,
by virtue of Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, the union is entitled to
eliminate all individual employee bargaining. In sports, however, individual athletes
may contract within the parameters of the collective bargaining agreement. PAUL C.
WEILER AND GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 307 (3d ed. 2004).
15. See MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at (f)(1).
16. A player is also eligible for arbitration if he is what is known as a “Super Two.”
A Super Two is a player who has only two years of Major League experience but (a) has
accumulated at least eighty-six days of service during the immediately preceding
season; and (b) ranks in the top 17% in total service in the class of players who have
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years, a player may invoke arbitration to determine his salary
but is not permitted to look for employment elsewhere. After
six years in the major leagues, a player is eligible for free
agency.17 Salary arbitration was originally instituted in MLB
in 1974 to protect players from the economic effects of the
controversial “reserve clause.” This clause gave a team the
right to retain a player at the contract of the team’s choosing
for the player’s entire career.18 The reserve clause was
essentially eliminated, for players in the league for six years,
with the implementation of free agency in 1976. Thus, the
goal of modern MLB arbitration is to adjust a player’s market
value while allowing a team to retain a player for at least six
years.
Major League Baseball uses final-offer arbitration to avoid
arbitration proceedings and to promote settlement. As noted
in the introduction, in this endeavor, the process is successful
in its ability to achieve pre-hearing settlements.19 In addition
to the direct benefits of final-offer arbitration, there are other
aspects of MLB’s final-offer salary arbitration that make
settlement more attractive than an arbitration proceeding.
For one, if the player and the owner manage to settle on a
salary figure before the hearing, they can be creative in
designing a compensation package. A settlement may include
bonuses, a no-trade clause, or a multi-year contract, among
other perks. Traditionally, baseball arbitration results in
players receiving one-year contracts. However, in 2009,
fifteen players who filed for arbitration received multi-year
contracts in lieu of the one-year contract (with all the terms of
their existing contract) that traditionally results from
entering into baseball arbitration.20 Additionally, there is the
two years of service. Id.
17. Id. at art. XX, § (b)(1).
18. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 143.
19. As noted in the Introduction, only three players went through arbitration in
2009, as opposed to the 108 players who settled. See supra note 13. This is consistent
with the settlement rates of the last few years. In 2008, 110 players filed for arbitration
and only eight entered into arbitration proceedings. In 2007, seven players went
through arbitration while 158 players filed. Maury Brown, Salary Arbitration Filings,
THE
BIZ
OF
BASEBALL,
Nov.
30,
2006,
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=492&Ite
mid=65. Maury Brown, Arbitration Scorecard, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL, Feb. 10, 2007,
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=719&Ite
mid=116.
20. Id. See also MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(6).
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invaluable incentive of maintaining a congenial relationship
between the player and management. In an arbitration
proceeding, the player would have to witness his team’s
management questioning his value to the team. As the player
likely will remain on the team,21 preserving a good
relationship is of great importance.
When teams and players cannot settle their differences
privately, baseball’s final-offer salary arbitration can provide
a quick, informal, final, and binding resolution to the
dispute.22 Appeals and player holdouts are both prohibited
under baseball arbitration.23 When an arbitrator has little
discretion and must choose between two offers with no
arbitral explanation permitted, an appeal makes little sense,
a benefit that affirms the finality of baseball’s final-offer
arbitration process.
C. The National Hockey League: Conventional Salary
Arbitration
Like MLB, the National Hockey League (“NHL”) offers
salary arbitration. However, the NHL, whose salary
21. A player will remain on the team unless he is traded, which typically occurs
when a small-market team cannot afford to give the player the raise he is due to receive
during the arbitration process. Additionally, a team may release a player (who has
received an arbitration award) during Spring Training. If the player is released more
than sixteen days before the beginning of the season, the team is responsible for thirty
days of the arbitration award. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. IX. If the player
is released within sixteen days, the team is then responsible for forty-five days of the
salary. Id. If the player remains with the team on Opening Day, however, the team is
responsible for the full award. Id.
It could be argued that because players may be released, salary arbitration
does not sufficiently protect players. However, if the players are released they are
entitled to at least thirty days’ salary. This would account for about one-sixth of an
entire season’s salary. For example, if a player is rewarded $6 million at arbitration
and is released at the start of spring training, he is entitled to $1 million. Further,
because his market value has been set by an arbitrator, the player will likely be able to
collect at least $5 million on the open market (with almost a full month before the start
of the season). Unless the arbitrator greatly misinterpreted the market he is supposed
to approximate, the player should be able to receive a sufficient award from another
team. Organizations are also deterred from releasing a player who has received an
arbitration award. A team would prefer to trade a player, pay nothing, and receive at
least some value rather than release the player and be responsible for one-sixth of the
award. It is rare that a player is released after an arbitration award. It is more
common for a team to trade such a player.
22. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 146.
23. Id. at 147. See also MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI.
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arbitration process was implemented in 1970,24 uses
conventional salary arbitration rather than final-offer salary
arbitration. Professor Abrams notes that, in hockey, an
arbitrator is almost certain to name a compensation figure
falling between the two offers presented by each side.25 In
2008, sixteen players filed for arbitration and two
participated in hearings.26 In 2007, thirty players filed for
arbitration and seven players entered into hearings.27 As of
2004, twenty-eight percent of NHL filings proceeded to
arbitration.28 As these statistics illustrate, the MLB is
generally more successful than the NHL in reaching prehearing settlements.29
Further, unlike in MLB, the salary arbitration process in
the NHL is not always binding. A team can refuse to
implement (“walk away” from) an arbitrator’s award if a
player has initiated the proceeding.30 Therefore, there is less
incentive for an NHL player to forego settlement and risk
going to a hearing and greater incentive for a team to risk an
award from which they can simply walk away.
In 2004, NHL team owners, in an attempt to control
increased wages, challenged the use of conventional salary
arbitration and championed for final-offer arbitration to be
included in the league’s collective bargaining agreement.31
The players’ association considered including final-offer
arbitration to appease the owners.32 The owners, however,
24. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 146.
25. Id. (noting that, “[i]n fact, [a hockey arbitrator] is almost certain to name a
compensation figure between the two extremes presented by each side.”).
26. 2008 Salary Arbitration Filings, CBSSPORTS.COM, June 27, 2008,
http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/story/10879613.
27. NHL Salary Arbitration, 2007 Player Arbitration List, SPORTS CITY,
http://www.sportscity.com/NHL/Salary-Arbitration.
28. Stephen M. Yoost, The National Hockey League and Salary Arbitration: Time
for a Line Change, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 485, 519 (2006).
29. Based on the figures in this paragraph, when the NHL did not have a salary
cap, its settlement rate was 72%. In 2008, the rate was 87.5% (in a very small sample
size of only sixteen filings) and in 2007, the rate was 76.7%. In 2009, Major League
Baseball’s settlement rate was 97.3% (108 settlements out of 111 filings). This number
is consistent with the history of Major League Baseball salary arbitration.
30. NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, § 12.10, available at
http://www.nhlpa.com/CBA/index.asp (providing for walk-away rights for player-elected
salary arbitration).
31. Arbitration,
CBC
SPORTS,
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepth/cba/issues/arbitration.html.
32. Larry Brooks, Union, NHL set to talk, N.Y. POST, Dec. 9, 2004, available at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nypost/access/759054421.html?dids=759054421:759054421
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wanted final-offer arbitration for the wrong reasons. With
little genuine interest in promoting settlement, the owners
believed that final-offer arbitration would control the increase
of salaries. Despite the discussion, the owners and the
players’ association opted to keep conventional arbitration
and instead instituted a hard salary cap33 that, for better or
worse, may make salary arbitration obsolete in the NHL.34
D. Procedural Variations of Final-Offer Arbitration
In a field where final-offer arbitration is appropriate, an
analysis should also include a discussion of which procedural
variation of final-offer arbitration should be applied. MLB and
the NHL limit their final-offer arbitration to disputes of one
specific issue (salary), but final-offer arbitration is also used
in contexts where there are a number of issues in dispute
(such as public employment interest arbitration). When there
are multiple issues involved, they may be approached with
“package” or “issue-by-issue” final-offer arbitration.35 Package
final-offer arbitration involves each party’s submitting his or
her final offer in the form of a package that addresses all
disputed issues.36 Instead of deciding each issue separately,
an arbitrator will select the more reasonable package. In
contrast, issue-by-issue final-offer arbitration allows each
party to submit an offer as to each disputed issue.37 An
arbitrator will then choose the more reasonable offer for each
disputed issue. Because of the numerous issues involved in
negotiating collective bargaining agreements, public
&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Dec+9%2C+2004&author=LARRY+
BROOKS&pub=New+York+Post&edition=&startpage=104&desc=UNION%2C+NHL+S
ET+TO+TALK.
33. A “hard salary cap” means that teams may not go above the salary cap for any
reason. The NFL and NHL currently have hard salary caps. The NBA, on the other
hand, utilizes a soft salary cap. A “soft salary cap” allows teams to exceed the salary cap
under certain circumstances. For example, NBA teams are allowed to spend above the
salary cap to retain their own players. This is known as the “Larry Bird Exception.”
Major League Baseball has no salary cap. Yoost, supra note 28, at 523-24.
34. With a hard salary cap, there is less incentive for a player to enter salary
arbitration. With no salary cap, there is no limit to how high a salary can go. For
example, in 2004 (prior to the introduction of a hard salary cap), 66 players filed for
arbitration. Yoost, supra note 28, at 485. As mentioned above, under a hard salary cap,
only 16 players filed in 2008 down from 30 in 2007.
35. See RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 938.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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employment interest arbitration statutes typically codify
which procedural variation will be used: package or issue-byissue.
E. Final-Offer Interest Arbitration of Collective Bargaining
Impasses
Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining agreement
uses final-offer arbitration as a contractual tool to promote
settlement and to avoid salary arbitration hearings. In the
context of public employment, however, final-offer arbitration
is primarily used to resolve impasses regarding the terms of
new collective bargaining agreements between a state or local
government and a union representing its public employees.38
Although MLB uses final-offer arbitration within its collective
bargaining agreement solely to resolve the issue of a player’s
salary, state governments typically use the process to resolve
bargaining impasses on a number of issues. Despite this key
difference in execution, the theories behind the use of finaloffer arbitration are similar.
Since states are reluctant to grant public employees the
right to strike, some states codify third-party procedures, such
as interest arbitration, to provide for an efficient resolution.
Within specific interest arbitration statutes, some states
expressly indicate what type of arbitration will be employed,
typically variations of final-offer or conventional arbitration,
while other states opt to leave this open.39 A state also may
codify which types of disputed issues are to be resolved by
each process. Interest arbitration, as a result of the pending
38. Upon reaching impasse, Iowa provides for final-offer arbitration for both
economic and non-economic issues on an issue-by-issue basis. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22.
In Maine, final-offer arbitration is used under the Maine Agriculture Marketing and
Bargaining Act. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A). Connecticut offers finaloffer arbitration for all state employees upon impasse on an issue-by-issue basis. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. 5-276a(c).Minnesota offers final-offer arbitration on an issue-by-issue
basis for “principals” and “assistant principals,” and offers final-offer arbitration on an
issue-by-issue or package basis otherwise. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (Subd. 7).Other
states using final-offer arbitration for labor disputes include Oklahoma, Pennsylvania
and Washington. OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. § 51-108(4); PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122-A; WASH.
REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.21.779. Michigan, Wisconsin and New Jersey allow final-offer
arbitration for public labor disputes involving firemen and policemen. MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. 423.238; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4)(b);N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16.
39. In New Jersey, for example, one can choose between variations of final-offer
arbitration and conventional arbitration instead of requiring one form. N.J. STAT. §
34:13A-16.
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Employee Free Choice Act, may also be utilized outside of the
public employment field.
1.Pending Legislation: The Employee Free Choice Act’s
Interest Arbitration Requirement
The Employee Free Choice Act, currently before Congress,
would “amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish
an efficient system to enable employees to join, or assist labor
organizations, to provide for mandatory injunctions for unfair
labor practices during organizing efforts, and for other
purposes.”40 The Act would also impose a system of
mandatory, binding interest arbitration between management
and a newly-certified union who cannot settle on the terms of
their first collective bargaining agreement. Prior to such
arbitration, the parties would be required to undergo
mediation.41 This legislation would apply to unions that
obtain recognition under the NLRA and would not apply to
state or federal government employees. However, in the
unlikely event that this Act is passed,42 a debate between
final-offer and conventional interest arbitration is likely to
follow. In light of this pending legislation, it is useful to
analyze state statutes that utilize final-offer interest
arbitration. Below are examples of states that have codified
final-offer interest arbitration.

40. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.800. (Last Visited Nov. 15, 2009).
41. Id. at § 3.
42. At this point, it is unlikely the bill will be passed in the near future. The Act is
often criticized and has lost support in the past year. Arlen Specter, whose support is
considered critical to the bill’s passage, announced recently that he opposed the
legislation. Specter noted: “The problems of the recession make this a particularly bad
time to enact Employee Free Choice legislation….If efforts are unsuccessful to give
labor sufficient bargaining power through amendments to the NLRA, then I would be
willing to reconsider Employees’ Free Choice legislation when the economy returns to
normalcy.” Arlen Specter opposes Employee Free Choice Act, WASH. BUS. J., Mar. 25,
2009,
available
at
http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2009/03/23/daily59.html.
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2. State Statutes that Codify Final-Offer Interest
Arbitration
a. Maine
Maine’s Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act
governs private relationships, although, due to National
Labor Relations Act preemption, reaches only those private
employers who do not fall within the NLRA. Maine requires
binding final-offer interest arbitration (after mandatory
mediation) in collective bargaining disputes between
agricultural “handlers” and “qualified associations.”43 The
statute defines “handlers” as agricultural employers
throughout the various stages of a given agricultural
process.44 “Qualified associations” include any association
certified to bargain on behalf of a group of producers.45 This is
the type of private impasse that the Employee Free Choice
Act would cover if the union (“qualified association”) were
certified under the NLRA and the Act’s proposed card check
system.46
Prior to 1987, Maine’s Act was limited to nonbinding finaloffer arbitration within the potato industry.47 In 1987, in an
effort to promote good-faith bargaining and settlement (a
stated goal of the section), Maine amended the Act by
providing for mandatory mediation followed by binding finaloffer arbitration for all disputes involving handlers and
qualified associations.48 The state likely sought to codify a
43. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958.
44. Id. at § 1955(3). “Handler” refers to any person engaged in the business or
practice of: A. Acquiring agricultural products from producers or associations of
producers for processing or sale; B. Grading, packaging, handling, storing, or processing
agricultural products received from producers or associations of producers; C.
Contracting or negotiating contracts or other arrangements, written or oral, with or on
behalf of producers or associations of producers with respect to production or marketing
of any agricultural product; or D. Acting as an agent or broker for a handler in the
performance of any function or act specified in paragraph A,B or C.
45. Id. at §§ 1955(5)-(6), 1957.
46. The Employee Free Choice Act allows for union certification if the majority of
employees have signed authorization cards designating the union as the employees’
bargaining representative. Employee Free Choice Act § 2(a)(6). The current system
requires that the union obtain a majority through secret ballot elections to achieve
certification.
47. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-A (repealed, 1987).
48. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958. See also Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hanson, 675 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Me. 1987).
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binding alternative to strikes in these negotiations because an
agricultural work stoppage would hurt the welfare of the
state. When appropriate, public policy may prompt a state to
take steps to protect against strikes in an important industry.
In this instance, Maine chose final-offer arbitration to serve
that end.
b. Public Employment State Statutes: Firemen and
Policemen
Final-offer statutes can address a variety of relationships,
ranging from broad labor relationships49 to narrow labor
relationships.50 A narrow labor relationship codified in the
respective statutes of New Jersey, Michigan, and Wisconsin is
the bargaining relationship between public fire and police
departments and their respective employee bargaining
units.51 In these states, statutory public policy prohibits
policemen and firemen from striking.52 This constraint is
common for public employees involved in public safety or
other essential services. Because firemen and policemen are
prohibited from striking, Michigan’s final-offer statute notes
that public policy requires an “alternate, expeditious, effective
and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes” to
maintain the efficient operation of each department.53 This
policy complements the advantages of final-offer arbitration.
Final-offer arbitration, in this context, can be included in a
statutory system that prevents potentially harmful wildcat
strikes.54 For these reasons, in public employment, the need
for procedural efficiency, good-faith bargaining, and a prehearing settlement have prompted some states to incorporate
49. In Connecticut, final-offer arbitration is used for all “state employees.” CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. 5-276a.
50. Maine’s use of final-offer arbitration is geared toward narrow labor
relationships. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A).
51. See supra note 38. The respective statutes of Michigan, Wisconsin and New
Jersey allow for final-offer arbitration for public labor disputes involving firemen and
policemen.
52. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-14 (Lexis 2009). MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.231 (Lexis
2008). WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (Lexis 2008).
53. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.231.
54. A “wildcat strike” is a strike “that is not authorized by the labor union to which
the employees belong.” A wildcat strike includes strikes that are not permitted under
state statute. See Answers.com, Wildcat Strike, http://www.answers.com/topic/wildcatstrike (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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final-offer arbitration.
i. New Jersey
In New Jersey, Section 16 of the Employer-Employee
Relations Act is unique in that it offers six variations of
arbitration from which parties may choose.55 The section
allows for conventional arbitration and five forms of finaloffer arbitration.56 Among these final-offer options are
package and issue-by-issue final-offer arbitration,57 as well as
variations of these methods in which the arbitrator may
utilize a third offer: a fact-finder’s recommendation on the
respective issue or package.58 Including a fact-finder
recommendation seems counterintuitive to the underlying
theory that final-offer arbitration facilitates settlement by
bringing the parties’ respective offers closer together. If the
parties are concerned with the fact-finder’s determination,
they may not present reasonable offers if they know that the
fact-finder will determine the most reasonable offer or
compromise. This may prevent the parties from reaching a
middle ground. A fifth final-offer option distinguishes between
economic and non-economic issues.59 For economic issues, the
statute suggests package final-offer arbitration.60 For noneconomic issues, the statute suggests issue-by-issue final-offer
arbitration.61
The statute provides that if the parties cannot agree on a
type of arbitration, conventional arbitration will be the
default option.62 Prior to 1995, however, the default was the
final-offer arbitration option that distinguished between
economic and non-economic issues.63 This change was likely
the result of a 1992 legislative proposal that sought to switch
the statute entirely to conventional arbitration.64 While the
legislation did not pass, the statute was amended to make
55. Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (C) (Lexis 2009).
56. Id.
57. Id. at (2), (3).
58. Id. at (4), (5).
59. Id. at (6).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(D)(2) (Lexis 2009).
63. Sen. Robert J. Martin, Fixing the Fiscal Police and Firetrap: A Critique of New
Jersey’s Compulsory Interest Arbitration Act, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59, 77 (1993).
64. 80 N.J. LEGIS. INDEX NO. 2, at A-1059(1)(c)(1) (March 2, 1992).
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conventional arbitration the default with each of the finaloffer arbitration options remaining in the statute should the
parties opt to use one of these options.
In 1999, a study in the Journal of Collective Negotiations
analyzed the effect of New Jersey’s switch to conventional
arbitration. The researchers hoped to demonstrate that finaloffer arbitration reduces the chilling effect of conventional
arbitration.65 The study found that in 1995, when the default
option was final-offer arbitration, the average “difference”
between firemen unions and municipality wage and benefit
offers was 29%.66 In 1997, the first full year with conventional
arbitration as the default option, this spread increased to
44%.67 Additionally, a 1980 survey, while far from
contemporary data, concluded that final-offer arbitration in
New Jersey was:
working reasonably well toward providing finality in police and
firefighter impasses and preventing strikes. Moreover, it seems to
appeal to the parties, and experience to date suggests that finaloffer arbitration, as compared to conventional arbitration, can
increase the probability of negotiated settlements by exerting a
centripetal force on the parties to move toward a middle ground.68

ii. Michigan and Wisconsin
Similar to one of New Jersey’s options, Michigan’s statute
distinguishes between economic and non-economic issues in
arbitration. Economic issues include wages, vacations,
insurance, and other economic benefits. Non-economic issues
include, for example, whether police officers should be
permitted to carry guns while off-duty. Michigan mandates
final-offer arbitration for exclusively economic issues in
disputes involving police and fire departments.69 This is most
likely because there is a greater risk of arbitral compromise of
economic issues. When there is a risk of compromise, finaloffer arbitration works to counter the “chilled” negotiations
65. Greg Stokes, Solomon’s wisdom: An early analysis of the effects of the police and
fire interest arbitration reform act in New Jersey, 28 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 219,
231 (1999).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Joan Weitzman & John M. Stochaj, Attitudes of Arbitrators Toward Final-Offer
Arbitration in New Jersey, 35 ARB. J. 25, 33 (1980).
69. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.238.
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associated with that risk. In Michigan, the arbitration panel
identifies the economic issues and directs each party to
submit their final offer for each issue.70 Unlike New Jersey,
Michigan mandates final-offer arbitration on an issue-byissue basis.71 New Jersey, as discussed above, recommends
package final-offer arbitration of economic issues.
Unless the parties agree otherwise, Wisconsin mandates
that package final-offer arbitration be used once an
investigator finds the parties to be at an impasse.72 Wisconsin
does not distinguish between economic and non-economic
issues. Much like the underlying purpose of final-offer
arbitration in MLB, the stated purpose of Wisconsin’s statute
is to induce the parties to bargain in good faith in order to
reach an agreement, or to at least narrow the differences
between the parties to the greatest extent possible.73
Although New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Michigan utilize
final-offer interest arbitration to accomplish similar objectives
in the same narrow context, the execution of these statutes is
inconsistent. Questions remain as to whether this
inconsistency can be resolved, if it needs to be resolved, and if
there is one ideal way to implement final-offer arbitration.
F. What do Major League Baseball salary arbitration and
public employment interest arbitration have in common?
While comparing the labor situation of MLB players to
that of state employees may seem problematic, the nature of
their relationships with their respective employers is similar
and may help to determine why final-offer arbitration is
utilized in such narrow contexts. Final-offer arbitration may
serve two functions. First, as previously discussed, it is a
technique that promotes pre-hearing settlement. Second, it is
a process for fixing market value when the parties have no
other way to do so, while avoiding the repercussions of an
adversarial arbitration proceeding.
In MLB and public
employment, final-offer arbitration serves both of these
functions. In public employment, state employees must
bargain exclusively with the state and some employees are
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4)(b).
73. La Crosse Prof’l Police Ass’n v. City of La Crosse, 212 Wis. 2d 90, 102 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1997).
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prohibited from striking. These state employees do not have
the benefit of their employment market and arbitration is a
tool to fix market value when the market is otherwise
unavailable. In MLB salary arbitration, players must bargain
exclusively with their organization because players are
“reserved” for six years. Both MLB players and state
employees are “locked in” a bargaining relationship with one
employer. The mandatory nature of these bargaining
relationships makes final-offer arbitration a useful tool in
mimicking an otherwise unavailable market.
Arbitration is often used to establish market value in a
bargaining relationship when there is no other method to
determine market value. Because MLB players and state
employees may lack both economic leverage and an
alternative to bargaining with their employers, arbitration
allows their market value to be set by a third party. Finaloffer arbitration, as opposed to conventional arbitration,
allows the parties to set market value themselves in prehearing negotiations with the looming arbitration as the
motivating factor in reaching settlements. This would allow
the “locked in” parties to preserve a congenial relationship
despite the adversarial aspects of arbitration being a
necessary aspect of the parties’ bargaining relationship.
It is important to note, however, that a bargaining
relationship does not need to satisfy both of these functions to
benefit from final-offer arbitration. Final-offer arbitration can
certainly be utilized as a settlement technique when the
parties are not “locked in.” However, MLB and public
employment do benefit from both functions, making final-offer
arbitration a particularly useful tool in those contexts.
G. How is Final-Offer Arbitration Best Utilized?
1. Procedural Variation: Package or Issue-by-Issue?
Before looking at the various contexts that could benefit
from final-offer arbitration, I will first consider which
procedural variation best fits within the theories of final-offer
arbitration: package or issue-by-issue final offers.
One common criticism of package final-offer arbitration is
that parties may be tempted to include outrageous offers on a
small percentage of issues in what is an otherwise reasonable
package. How should an arbitrator weigh a reasonable
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package with a few unreasonable offers against a less
reasonable package that is more consistent? On that note,
what if both parties include extreme offers on a few issues?
This would force an arbitrator to decide between the
unreasonable offers included in each package. Additionally,
these extreme offers on specific issues may not be feasible and
put the arbitrator in the difficult position of not being able to
select a reasonable package at all. Although the theory behind
final-offer arbitration is that each party will make the most
reasonable offer possible so that his or her offer will be
selected, parties may also take advantage of the packaged
format.
On the other hand, in an issue-by-issue hearing, the
bargaining required for each disputed area forces the parties
to submit reasonable offers on each issue, bringing the
opposing offers closer together on at least some issues prior to
hearings. Package final-offers, as compared to issue-by-issue
arbitration, seem to inhibit pre-hearing settlements. In an
issue-by-issue arbitration, the parties may be more likely to
settle specific issues before the hearing, but in package
arbitration, parties may want to take their chances at the
hearing so they can assemble a reasonable package that best
suits their needs. Although in an issue-by-issue arbitration all
of the issues may not be settled prior to a hearing, the parties
can eliminate some issues from the dispute. Negotiating a
settlement with packaged offers, on the other hand, forces the
parties to negotiate all of the issues at once.
Despite
its
advantages,
issue-by-issue
final-offer
arbitration can also undermine the goals of final-offer
arbitration.
An arbitrator may split the difference by
awarding half of the issues to one party and the other half of
the issues to the other party. This gives an arbitrator greater
discretion to fashion his own package. In a packaged offer, on
the other hand, an arbitrator is restricted to one complete
package, unable to split the difference.
The important thing to consider regarding this scenario is
whether splitting the difference creates the chilling effect that
final-offer arbitration seeks to prevent. As we have seen, the
risk is that, because the arbitrator is seen as likely to
compromise, the parties make offers that are far apart: for
this reason, settlement is unlikely to occur before the hearing.
Even though it affords an arbitrator greater discretion, when
an arbitrator splits the difference on a group of multiple
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issues (and is not permitted to split the difference on any one
issue), the parties never actually split the difference on a
singular issue and, therefore, this format neither produces the
chilling effect nor undermines the goals of final-offer
arbitration. It is still to the strategic advantage of the parties
to make reasonable offers as to each issue, as they have no
way to predict which issues will be determined in their favor.
While issue-by-issue final offers are more complex than
package final offers, they are more aligned with the objectives
of final-offer arbitration. Although limiting the discretion of
an arbitrator is one goal of final-offer arbitration, its biggest
aim is to reach settlement before the arbitration hearing. In
other words, pre-hearing behavior is more relevant to the
goals of final-offer arbitration than behavior during an actual
hearing.
These procedural concerns do not pose a problem in MLB’s
salary arbitrations because there is only one issue in dispute.
This may be one reason why MLB’s final-offer salary
arbitration works so smoothly and efficiently in promoting
settlement before an arbitration hearing. Because a greater
number of disputed issues presents the procedural concerns
discussed above, based on the success of MLB, final-offer
arbitration presumably works best when there are fewer
issues at stake. But, when there are multiple issues in
question, issue-by-issue final offers may be more appropriate.
2. Timing of the “Final Offers”
Another important element of final-offer arbitration is the
timing of the offers. The appropriate timing of offers may help
to further the goals of the process. The question is whether
the offers should be submitted just prior to the hearing, early
in negotiations, or sometime in the middle. In MLB, teams
and players may submit final offers anytime between January
5 and January 15.74 If an organization reduces its offer on or
after January 15, then the player’s window to submit to
arbitration is extended for seven days.75 The arbitral
proceedings occur between February 1 and February 20.76
Between the submission in January and the proceeding in
74. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(5).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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February, the parties are free to negotiate and, as discussed
earlier, often opt to settle during these negotiations.
Final offers should be permitted as early as possible prior
to the arbitration hearing, but should be adjustable for a
relatively short grace period. This would positively affect the
dynamics of the negotiations and promote the goals of finaloffer arbitration. Since MLB teams must submit their offers
approximately one month before the proceedings, the parties
are likely to act more reasonably in the early stages of
negotiations. Allowing a grace period in which offers are
adjustable would also promote the goals of final-offer
arbitration. Although parties may begin bargaining with
extreme final offers, they would have to adjust to more
moderate offers as preliminary negotiations progress. It is
important that the parties have this grace period to promote a
“battle of reasonable offers” that would bring the parties
toward a middle ground. In order to limit the
unreasonableness of the parties’ early final offers, this grace
period should not be extended until the hearing. At the end of
this grace period, the parties’ offers must be as reasonable as
possible. The combination of the reasonable final offers and
the fear of losing to the opposing offer would serve to bring
the parties toward a middle ground.
One argument against this may be that there is nothing to
lose from allowing the final offers to be adjusted right up until
the hearing. This timeline, however, may encourage parties
to conceal their most reasonable offers until late in the
bargaining process. If, for example, there were five days
between the conclusion of the grace period and the hearing,
the parties would present their most reasonable final offers
and likely find a middle ground in the five days leading up to
the hearing. If the parties have until the day of the
arbitration, they may conceal their most reasonable offers
until the proceeding itself, undermining the final-offer goal of
an efficient pre-hearing settlement. Requiring both the early
submission of final offers and a narrow window to adjust
these final offers would best support the goals of final-offer
arbitration.
3. Contexts
After determining which procedural variations may be
best suited for multiple issue final-offer interest arbitration,
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we turn our analysis to other contexts which may benefit from
the use of final-offer arbitration.
It is important to first outline the elements that make
final-offer arbitration conducive to a given context. First, it is
best to have sophisticated parties use final-offer arbitration.
Some literature has suggested that the parties must
understand the process in order for it to work.77 The theory is
that if a party does not understand the objectives of final-offer
arbitration, the process may be misused. In MLB, it is well
known among the management, the agents, and even the
players that the purpose of final-offer salary arbitration is to
avoid the hearing and to make market adjustments. If two
unsophisticated parties are involved in a contract dispute,
they may see an opponent’s more reasonable offer as a
concession. This party may not understand that a final-offer
arbitrator is likely to choose the more reasonable offer and, as
a result, the party may imprudently refuse to submit their
own reasonable offer.
Second, final-offer arbitration works best as part of a longterm, standardized procedure where maintaining positive
relationships between the parties is a priority. In MLB, salary
arbitration occurs at the same time each year and has become
a standardized component of the League’s off-season.
Additionally, after salary arbitration, players, barring a trade,
remain with the organization. Therefore, it is important to
keep the proceedings as amicable as possible. Final-offer
arbitration achieves this congenial tone by promoting prehearing settlement and by avoiding the adversarial nature of
an arbitration proceeding or litigation. Similarly, in the field
of public employment, final-offer arbitration is a regular
procedure when collective bargaining agreements are due for
renewal. Like MLB salary arbitration, it is important to make
the process as friendly as possible because the public
employees will continue to work for the city after the interest
arbitration process has concluded.
Third, final-offer arbitration is most successful when a prehearing settlement might contain benefits that an arbitration
award cannot offer. For example, as discussed earlier, MLB
settlements may include bonuses, multi-year contracts, and
other incentives that are not available through an arbitration
77. Angelo DeNisi & James B. Dworkin, Final-Offer Arbitration and the Naïve
Negotiator, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 79 (1981).
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award. Another inherent benefit of a pre-hearing settlement
is its cost effectiveness. Because of its tendency to promote
settlement, final-offer arbitration is a cheaper, quicker, and
generally more efficient alternative to conventional
arbitration and litigation.
This advantage is especially
critical when a strike or expensive dispute would have a
debilitating impact on the parties. States presumably use
final-offer arbitration in public employment disputes to avoid
the crippling effect of a wildcat strike by employees essential
to the welfare and safety of the community.
There are also various private contexts that could benefit
from reaching pre-hearing settlements. For example, when a
private dispute involves money, the cost effectiveness of finaloffer arbitration may be beneficial. While it may seem odd for
private parties to contract for a form of arbitration that is
intended to avoid arbitration hearings, a party may use it to
protect itself when it does not know if the opposing party will
contest the issue in question.
Some contexts may benefit from final-offer arbitration
because the bargaining parties must negotiate exclusively
with each other and have no other recourse within the
relevant market. Final offer arbitration may be an effective
tool when parties are “locked in” because they have no other
method to assert their rights and mimic the market other
than through the arbitration process. The final-offer
arbitration process thus allows the parties to re-create the
market while preserving the amiability of the “locked in”
bargaining relationship.
Finally, as detailed in the discussion of the package and
issue-by-issue procedural variations, final-offer arbitration is
most effective for addressing as few disputed issues as
possible. While final-offer arbitration can still be effective
with multiple issues at stake, arbitrating a few select issues
allows the parties to avoid the dilemma of choosing the most
appropriate procedural variation.
a. The Employee Free Choice Act and Final-Offer
Interest Arbitration
Before considering how final-offer arbitration could be
utilized outside of public employment and MLB, I will analyze
the potential role of final-offer interest arbitration under the
Employee Free Choice Act. If the Employee Free Choice Act,
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or another NLRA amendment mandating interest arbitration,
is enacted, there may be a choice between various forms of
interest arbitration, including final-offer. This paper does not
take a position on the controversial Act’s mandate of interest
arbitration but rather analyzes which form of interest
arbitration should be applied if the Act, or a similar
amendment, does take effect.
An important concern regarding the Act’s interest
arbitration requirement is that unions and employers may
rely on an arbitrator to impose an agreement rather than
participating
in
good-faith
bargaining.78
Another
apprehension is that private parties would be bound to the
terms of a contract set by an arbitrator.79 The idea is that if
an employer or union is bound to such terms, it could
complicate future grievance arbitrations in which an
arbitrator would apply the disputed terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to the specific grievance. Although this
would not complicate the proceeding in a technical sense,
employers and unions would be forced to apply rules not
mutually agreed upon. This is a subtle yet critical benefit of
pre-hearing settlement in interest arbitration.
Final-offer issue-by-issue interest arbitration, as opposed
to conventional interest arbitration, is better at addressing
both of these concerns. Final-offer arbitration encourages
parties to bargain in good faith and to settle at least some
issues prior to arbitration so that the contract reflects more of
a mutual agreement between the union and employer. If
unions and employers believe that the arbitrator will select
the more reasonable offer, they each will present reasonable
offers, bringing the parties toward a middle ground on the
particular issue. If the unions and employers settle before
arbitration, they are bound to the terms mutually agreed
upon rather than to terms imposed by an arbitrator.
Under the proposed Act, the arbitrator’s award is binding
for two years unless the terms are amended by the written
consent of the parties.80 If the parties choose to participate in
a final-offer arbitration hearing, one party’s offer will be
deemed the “winner.” This would likely prevent future
78. Id.
79. Andrew Lee Younkins. Judicial Review Standards for Interest Arbitration
under the Employee Free Choice Act, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 447, 453 (2008).
80. See Employee Free Choice Act § 3.
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amendment. However, there is little reason to believe parties
will seek amendment after conventional arbitration; thus, the
pre-hearing settlement aspects of final-offer arbitration may
still be preferable.
Another reason final-offer arbitration may be preferable to
conventional arbitration is the “locked in” nature of these new
relationships. After the streamlined certification under the
proposed amendment to the NLRA, the union becomes the
exclusive bargaining representative for the employees, and
the employer and the union must negotiate with each other.
Like salary arbitration in MLB and interest arbitration in
public employment, the relationship between certified union
and employer could benefit from final-offer arbitration
because of the mandatory and continuing nature of their
bargaining relationship.
If the Employee Free Choice Act is enacted, interest
arbitration will become a requirement between unions and
employers who cannot agree on the terms of their first
collective bargaining agreement. In this context, final-offer
interest arbitration may be appropriate to counteract the
“chilled” bargaining associated with conventional arbitration.
As it is in the best interests of both “locked in” parties to
maintain a congenial relationship after the proceeding, the
settlement promoting aspects of final-offer arbitration are
preferable. Therefore, final-offer interest arbitration would be
a suitable method for executing the mandatory interest
arbitration under the proposed legislation.
b. Interest Arbitration and Economic Issues
Within interest arbitration, a state may choose particular
issues to be covered by final-offer arbitration. Michigan’s
statute requiring interest arbitration for police and fire
departments distinguishes between economic and noneconomic issues. Economic issues, such as wages, vacations,
insurance, and other economic benefits are well suited to the
theories of final-offer arbitration. For example, if police
officers in Michigan dispute the amount of vacation time they
would receive in the new collective bargaining agreement,
final-offer arbitration would promote settlement. In a
conventional arbitration, the policemen’s union could assume
that the arbitrator would compromise and, based on this
assumption, make an extreme numerical offer to secure as
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many vacation days as possible. The city may similarly offer
an unreasonably low number of vacation days. In final-offer
arbitration, on the other hand, the union or employer would
be more likely to make a reasonable offer so that their offer is
selected and the officers receive an acceptable amount of
vacation time. As economic issues often hinge on a numerical
value, final-offer arbitration makes sense in that it would
function in a fashion similar to MLB salary arbitration. Even
when economic issues do not hinge on a number, a risk of
arbitral compromise still exists, making final-offer arbitration
a useful tool.
The reason for distinguishing between non-economic and
economic issues may also be due to the nature of noneconomic issues as opposed to economic issues. With respect
to non-economic issues, an arbitrator may not be able to
compromise certain non-economic issues thereby eliminating
the risk of arbitral compromise. For example, how would an
arbitrator compromise a non-economic issue such as whether
police officers should be permitted to bring their police cars
home with them? The officers can either bring them home, or
they cannot. There is no recognizable middle ground. Finaloffer arbitration is meant to address the “chilled” bargaining
associated with conventional arbitration in certain contexts.
Without any risk of arbitral compromise, final-offer
arbitration may not be necessary to counteract this “chilled”
bargaining.
A dispute over vacation time or other economic perks, on
the other hand, can benefit from final-offer arbitration
because of the numerical nature of these issues and the risk of
arbitral compromise. For non-economic disputes it may be
difficult to identify a middle ground or what constitutes a
reasonable offer.
Additionally, the bargaining risks
associated with conventional arbitration that final-offer
arbitration is meant to address do not apply to certain noneconomic issues. Limiting a state statute to final-offer
arbitration of economic issues would restrict final-offer
arbitration to those issues that it is most effective at settling.
Distinguishing between economic and non-economic issues
is one way to identify those issues that are most appropriate
for final-offer arbitration. It is important to distinguish
between the two issues so that final-offer arbitration can be
used when it is most appropriate and necessary to counteract
the chilled bargaining associated with conventional arbitrator
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compromise.
c. Value Disputes
One type of private dispute that may benefit from finaloffer arbitration is a dispute over the value of an item or
service. Final-offer arbitration is ideal for facilitating
settlement in these disputes. Like numerical economic issues,
this would proceed in a similar fashion to baseball salary
arbitration. When a specific value is in question, final-offer
arbitration may counteract the chilling effect of conventional
arbitration because there is an identifiable middle ground
between any two offers.
When money is the primary issue in a dispute, parties may
be more willing to settle because of the looming costs of an
arbitration hearing or litigation. Therefore, final-offer
arbitration offers the prospect of a cost-efficient settlement.
With regard to value disputes, various private
relationships would benefit from final-offer arbitration. For
example, long-term contracts could use final-offer arbitration
to resolve pricing disputes. Such arbitration would allow
these contracts to adjust to changes in the market in an
efficient manner. Additionally, parties to a long-term contract
have a continuing relationship that is best preserved through
the more amicable use of final-offer arbitration.
One example would be a long-term contract in a
commodities market, such as oil. Sophisticated parties could
contract for final-offer arbitration as to pricing disputes based
on fluctuations in the market. Final-offer arbitration can
provide for an efficient resolution so that a business may
adjust through a final-offer induced settlement without the
financial damage of an arbitration proceeding or litigation.
Another example is a contract between multiple investors for
the proceeds of an invention. Private parties could stipulate in
their contract that any disputes over royalties must be
submitted to final-offer arbitration. With only one monetary
issue at stake in a long-term contract between sophisticated
parties, such disputes are ideal for such arbitration.
Another area that could benefit from final-offer arbitration
is the entertainment field. In the past few years, monetary
residuals of new media have been a controversial topic.81 As
81. As of May, 2009, the Screen Actors Guild (“SAG”) and the Alliance of Motion
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new media outlets such as Hulu and iTunes are created,
writers and actors have been excluded from the resulting
economic benefits because the new media were not
contemplated in their original contracts. This led to the
Writers’ Guild strike in 2008 and to the 2009 collective
bargaining struggle between the Screen Actors Guild and the
Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers
(“AMPTP”).
When new media are created, actors and writers could
benefit from the inclusion of a clause for final-offer arbitration
in either individual contracts or a future collective bargaining
agreement. Collective bargaining agreements in the
entertainment industry are similar to those in the sports
world in that individuals may bargain under the general
umbrella of the collective agreement. As the parties have a
continuing and “locked in” relationship, final-offer arbitration
as to these controversial residuals may be an effective tool.
When the next “Hulu” is created, actors and producers may
have final-offer arbitration in their contracts, or a bargaining
agreement that promotes an efficient settlement for how the
ensuing residuals are to be applied.
A final example is a monetary dispute related to real
estate development. In any contract between architects,
general contractors, subcontractors, or buyers, it is inevitable
that the project will result in some dispute as to the value of a
service. It would be beneficial for these contracts to include a
final-offer arbitration clause to promote the settlement of
these disputes in a cost-efficient manner. For example, a
general contractor may contract with a subcontractor for
$50,000 but if the subcontractor unexpectedly values his work
at $75,000, a monetary dispute will arise that could be settled
through the use of final-offer arbitration. In this scenario,
liability is not at issue, rather, the parties are simply
disputing a numerical value. Reasonable offers do exist in
Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP) are negotiating a new collective bargaining
agreement. For thirteen months, the two parties have failed to reach an agreement.
Recently, the AMPTP offered a contract that SAG members are voting on. The most
controversial topic has been the residuals from new media such as iTunes and Hulu.
Because these new media were not contemplated in the original contracts, the actors
and writers are not receiving economic benefits when their work is downloaded on
iTunes or viewed on Hulu. The current offer provides residuals from streaming
websites such as Hulu. Bob Strauss, SAG Members Set To Vote On New Pact, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, May 18, 2009, available at http://www.dailynews.com/news/ci_12399660.
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such situations, and two sophisticated parties will understand
that a final-offer arbitrator will choose the most reasonable
offer, bringing the parties to a middle ground. These parties
may have an interest in maintaining a professional
relationship and a settlement may be desirable to serve that
end.
The list of private value disputes that could contract for
final-offer arbitration is seemingly endless. When a long-term
contract and sophisticated parties are involved, final-offer
arbitration of value disputes is a viable option.
Of course, final-offer arbitration need not be limited to
value disputes. Value disputes do benefit from final-offer
arbitration because, in these contexts, there is almost always
a risk of arbitral compromise. But any situation where such a
risk exists would benefit from final-offer arbitration. Value
disputes are just one scenario in which the risk of arbitral
compromise is clear to the parties and would undoubtedly
affect bargaining behavior.
d. Professional Sports Leagues and Final-Offer
Salary Arbitration: Is Major League Baseball an
Anomaly?
The successful use of final-offer salary arbitration in MLB
raises the question of whether other leagues’ collective
bargaining agreements could benefit from the use of finaloffer salary arbitration. Salary arbitration is an ideal
situation for final-offer arbitration because the dispute is
economic in nature, utilizes a standardized procedure, and
involves a continuing relationship between sophisticated
parties. Additionally, in any sports contract, there are
contractual benefits to settling before salary arbitration
hearings, such as bonuses and multi-year contracts. If a sport
uses salary arbitration, then final-offer arbitration makes
sense.
In the sports world, however, MLB’s use of salary
arbitration appears to be an anomaly. Since players currently
flourish under National Football League (NFL) and National
Basketball Association (NBA) free agency, a player-driven
process such as salary arbitration is not currently necessary.
The NFL and NBA use restricted free agency, in lieu of salary
arbitration, to adjust a player’s salary. The use of restricted
free agency in these two leagues allows other teams to offer a
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contract to players that the original team has the option to
match.82 This process lets the market itself determine the
players’ value while permitting the team to retain the player
if they agree to the players’ value. The idea of salary
arbitration is to mimic the market. With restricted free
agency, the NFL and NBA use the market itself to adjust a
player’s salary while allowing the teams to retain a player if
they choose to accept the market’s valuation. In addition, the
NFL and the NBA, like the NHL, have salary caps that make
salary arbitration less desirable for players and owners alike.
Further, NFL teams typically do not grant guaranteed
contracts to their second-tier players, which can make binding
salary arbitration less attractive. The reason is that such
players may be released at any time after a potential award,
unless the salary arbitration process protects against such a
release. This may change, however, when a new collective
bargaining agreement is negotiated during or before 2011.83
This new agreement likely will result in a salary structure
that will allow teams to grant more guaranteed contracts and
will undoubtedly include a rookie pay scale as it functions in
the NBA.84 Because of this pay scale, salary arbitration may
be an option to protect rookies a couple years into their initial
contract. For example, NFL rookies currently receive
substantial contracts.85 With a potential pay scale, however,
82. See Ryan T. Dryer, Comment, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J.
DISP. RESOL. 267, 277.
83. In May 2008, NFL owners voted unanimously to opt out of the league’s current
labor deal. If a deal is not reached before 2011, then the owners may lockout the
players. John Clayton, NFL owners vote unanimously to opt out of labor deal,
ESPN.COM, May 20, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3404596.
84. On April 2, 2009, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell stated that rookie salaries
are excessive and that the new collective bargaining agreement should address this:
“The money should go to the people that have produced on the NFL level or on the
professional level....And I just think, though we’ve had a number of great rookies
coming in, not everyone makes that transition as successfully, and you want to make
sure that the system rewards the people who perform and I think that’s what we have
to figure out in the next collective bargaining agreement. How do we pay the players
fairly? How do we compensate them properly after they’ve proven themselves on the
NFL level?” John Clayton, Time to fix rookie salary structure, ESPN.COM, Apr. 2, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=clayton_john&id=4036126.
As
the union does not yet represent rookies, it seems inevitable that rookie salaries will be
capped in the upcoming collective bargaining agreement.
85. Jake Long, the first pick in the 2008 NFL Draft, received a $57.75 million
contract with a $30 million signing bonus, making him the highest paid lineman in the
NFL before even stepping out onto the field. Dolphins sign Long, will select OT No. 1
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NFL rookies would be relegated to a certain salary depending
on where they are drafted. Salary arbitration could be a
useful tool for reevaluating a player’s performance during the
player’s rookie contract, prior to free agent eligibility. This
would function similarly to MLB salary arbitration. If the
rookie performs well, then his salary may adjust with the
market. Because NFL teams historically have been willing to
give inflated sums to rookies, the restrictive salary cap is less
of a hindrance to salary arbitration than it is in the
financially unstable NHL. In the unlikely event that salary
arbitration is used in the NFL in the context of the inevitable
rookie pay scale, final-offer arbitration would be a tool to
facilitate efficient settlements much like those of MLB.
If the NHL had not instituted a hard salary cap,86 it could
have benefitted from a switch to final-offer arbitration. While
it remains a viable option, the diminishing importance of
salary arbitration in the NHL makes it a concern less worthy
of comment, especially considering the League’s troubled
financial issues.87 While final-offer arbitration would not solve
the NHL’s escalating salaries, it would be a more efficient
way for player salaries to adjust to market value. For a league
that struggles financially,88 avoiding costly arbitration
proceedings and promoting settlement could only be of help.
However, particular aspects of the NHL’s bargaining
agreement might undermine the theories of final-offer
arbitration. For example, the fact that NHL owners can walk
away from an arbitration award may inhibit settlement
because management may want to risk arbitration since it is
not necessarily saddled with the arbitrator’s decision.
With respect to professional sports leagues, it is unlikely
that final-offer arbitration will be used outside of MLB simply
because salary arbitration does not fit within the structure of
the other leagues. If salary arbitration were appropriate in a
given league, however, final-offer arbitration would be a
better option than conventional arbitration.

overall,
ESPN.COM,
Apr.
22,
2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/draft08/news/story?id=3358424. As a result of the pay
scale, the first pick in the NBA Draft receives less than $4 million a year.
86. Yoost, supra note 28, at 523.
87. See NHL Business, http://www.andrewsstarspage.com/NHL-Business/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2009).
88. Id.
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H. Conclusion
Final-offer arbitration works well as a salary adjuster in
MLB and has proven to be a workable option in public
employment interest arbitration. Final-offer arbitration,
however, need not and should not be limited to MLB and
public employment. There are numerous private relationships
that could benefit from using such arbitration as a
contractual tool to resolve disputes in an efficient manner.
III. WHAT FACTORS SHOULD A FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATOR BE
PERMITTED TO CONSIDER?
A. The Criteria an Arbitrator May Consider
In interest arbitration, selecting the controlling criteria for
a proceeding is a complicated and important task. For
grievance arbitration, one need only look at what the parties
intended in a contract, whereas in salary arbitration and
public employment interest arbitration, no single factor is
controlling. For example, in a MLB wage determination,
comparing one player’s performance to that of another player
will provide an arbitrator with guidance, but there are other
relevant factors to consider, such as the length and
consistency of the player’s career contribution. The
determination does not hinge on one single factor and the
weight and use of each factor is debatable.89
This section will examine the criteria that a final-offer
arbitrator is typically allowed to consider and how such
factors mesh with the theories and goals of final-offer
arbitration. This section will place particular emphasis on the
appropriate number of criteria, the thoroughness of each
criterion, the weight each criterion receives, and whether a
private- or public-sector arbitrator should consider an
employer’s financial position.
A collective bargaining agreement, statute, or private
agreement typically dictates the criteria an arbitrator may or
must consider and, in some cases, which criteria must be
excluded. Common criteria include: comparability, ability to
89. For example, when considering an employer’s financial position: what
information is relevant? Is speculative information appropriate? Additionally, what
weight is given to this factor as compared to the other relevant factors?
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pay, productivity, variations in job content or hazards,
historical trends, equity, forces within the marketplace, and
criteria that are specifically geared toward a respective
context.90 The purpose of setting criteria is to mimic the
market. An arbitrator is establishing market value so the
factors serve to re-create the parties’ bargaining market in
the absence of the arbitrator. In some instances, however,
agreed-upon policy may require that the market not be
perfectly re-created due to the nature of the given context.
Comparability and an employer’s financial position have
proven to be the most controversial factors.91 Arbitrators are
likely to decide in such a way as to increase their professional
demand. Because it follows that they would adhere strictly to
the factors outlined in a given agreement or statute,
establishing the most appropriate list of criteria can enhance
the efficacy of final-offer arbitration.
B. Major League Baseball’s Salary Arbitration Criteria
In MLB salary arbitration, the criteria an arbitrator may
consider include the quality of the player’s contribution to his
team during the past season; the length and consistency of his
career contribution; the record of the player’s past
compensation; comparative baseball salaries; the existence of
any physical or mental defects on the part of the player; and
the recent performance record of the team including, but not
limited to, its league standing and attendance as an
indication of public acceptance.92 The agreement allows the
arbitrator, in his discretion, to assign a weight to each of the
criteria that appears appropriate under the circumstances.93
1. Weight Issues
One potential issue is the lack of pre-assigned weight
given to the criteria, which may impede settlement. MLB’s
90. Tim Bornstein, Interest Arbitration in Public Employment: An Arbitrator View
of the Process, 83 LAB. J. 77, 83 (1978).
91. Comparability is criticized because it creates an unending spiral of wage
increases and because it often relies on evidence that is unclear, ambiguous and easily
manipulated. Ability to pay is controversial, especially in the public sector, because it
has been criticized as speculative and unfair to employees. These criteria often conflict
with each other. See Martin, supra note 63, at 69.
92. See MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(12).
93. Id.
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collective bargaining agreement instructs the arbitrators to
consider both the player’s prior-year performance as well as
his entire career performance, but does not instruct an
arbitrator on how to weigh these factors with respect to
comparability.94
Inconsistencies
between
a
player’s
performance throughout his career and the most recent
season may keep offers apart, which runs contrary to the
theory of final-offer arbitration. Because the agreement does
not prioritize among these conflicting factors, a team and a
player may disagree as to which factor is more important.
Consider the following hypothetical: Player A performs at a
$10 million level for the first two seasons of his career but
plays at a $1 million level in his third year. Player A’s agent
will want to consider the player’s whole career while
management will emphasize the player’s performance during
the most recent season. This keeps the parties in
disagreement and inhibits settlement. In final-offer
arbitration, the criteria should be geared toward promoting
pre-hearing settlement. When any two criteria have the
potential to conflict, each party may interpret the conflict in
its favor. If an agreement were to outline how such a conflict
should be interpreted in arbitration, the parties would be
better able to predict an arbitrator’s behavior and more likely
to settle on a middle ground prior to arbitration.
2. Inadmissible Evidence
The agreement also stipulates six types of inadmissible
evidence in an arbitration proceeding. The financial position
of a player or club is one such factor.95 The agreement also
prohibits parties from discussing, and arbitrators from
considering, the League’s Competitive Balance Tax (also
known as the League’s “luxury tax”).96 This tax, created in
2000, requires teams whose payroll exceeds a certain figure,
calculated each year, be taxed on this excess amount.97 This
tax is deposited into a League “industry growth fund.”98
These exclusions are examples of how an agreement’s criteria
94. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 150. Abrams listed this weight issue as one
reason why parties in baseball arbitration may not settle.
95. See MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at § (f)(12)(b)(i).
96. Id. § (f)(14).
97. Id. art. XXIII.
98. Id.
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may purposefully skew the market. Although the market for
players would undoubtedly be affected by the financial
position of a given team, it may be in the “best interests of
baseball” to exclude a team’s financial position in the context
of salary arbitration so that a player is not punished for being
drafted by a financially inferior organization. This exclusion
is one of the few complaints among owners regarding finaloffer arbitration. Baseball management has criticized salary
arbitration since 1974 for inflating player salaries by
overemphasizing the comparability factor while excluding a
team’s financial position.99
Studies have noted that even players who “lose”
arbitration still make, on average, a 150% increase from their
previous year’s salary.100 The reason for this increase is that
salary arbitration is a tool designed to adjust a player’s salary
to the current market and to the player’s performance.
Typically, salary arbitration occurs while a player is still
bound by an inexpensive rookie contract so it is expected that
salaries will increase to adjust a player’s salary to match their
performance. A player is unlikely to deserve less than what
he earned before playing in the major leagues, so it comes as
little surprise that salaries increase in baseball salary
arbitration. There is validity, however, to the argument that
salary arbitration essentially forces small-market teams to
account for the extravagant free-agent spending of big-market
teams. This has forced many small-market teams to trade
away arbitration-eligible players.101
If an arbitrator were to consider a team’s financial
position, however, a small-market team would be more likely
to risk an arbitration hearing than to settle for a salary it
cannot, or would prefer not to, pay. On the other hand, the
99. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 164.
100. James B. Dworkin. Collective Bargaining in Baseball: Key Current-Issues, 39
LAB. L.J. 480 (1988).
101. For example, this past off-season, the Florida Marlins, notorious for cutting
costs and maintaining a low payroll, traded arbitration-eligible first-baseman Mike
Jacobs to the Kansas City Royals. Jacobs, who had earned $395,000 with the Marlins in
2008, was signed by the Royals to a one-year, $3.275 million contract. The Marlins
traded Jacobs because they did not want to pay for Jacobs’ expected salary increase.
This is a common occurrence when players on small-market teams become eligible for
arbitration. It should be noted that the Royals are also a small-market team, but
typically have a much higher payroll than the Marlins. Slugger Jacobs agrees to oneyear
deal
with
Royals,
CBSSPORTS.COM,
Feb.
18,
2009,
http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/story/11390437.
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policy likely behind this exclusion is that players should not
be punished for being drafted by financially inferior teams. A
delicate balance could be achieved that would allow a player
to adjust his salary within the confines of a team’s financial
capabilities, but the fact remains that allowing an arbitrator
to consider a team’s financial position would run contrary to
theories of final-offer arbitration. One idea is that arbitrators,
in implementing the comparability factor, take into account
the financial position of a comparable player’s organization. A
player for a big-market team who makes $10 million may be
very different from a player for a small-market team who
makes $10 million. The collective bargaining agreement
apparently attempts to address this by noting that “the
arbitration panel shall consider the salaries of all comparable
players and not merely the salary of a single player or group
of players.”102 Expanding upon this language could appease
the owners’ concerns while continuing to promote settlement
and allowing the arbitration process to account for a player’s
increased value. Additionally, greater specificity would give
the parties a better understanding of how an arbitrator will
view a player’s market value, even if that market value is not
a perfect reflection of the actual market.
The policy behind excluding information regarding which
teams may be subject to the luxury tax is that an arbitrator
should not base a player’s salary on the fact that a wealthy
team, such as the New York Yankees, may have to pay double
for its arbitration-eligible players.103 Unlike the excluded
financial position criterion, excluding information regarding
the luxury tax has not faced much criticism. It is relevant,
however, as an example of an excluded factor that is
disadvantageous to big-market teams.
C. Criteria Permitted in State Statutes
Generally, final-offer state statutes require an arbitrator
to consider factors similar to those listed for salary arbitration
in MLB’s collective bargaining agreement. For example,
comparability is a central aspect of both state statutes and
102. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(13).
103. For example, if an arbitrator awards a New York Yankee $5 million, the
Yankees must pay $5 million to the player and an additional $5 million to the “industry
growth fund” if the team has surpassed the payroll cap for a given year. MLB
Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XXIII.
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the MLB agreement.104 One notable difference, however, is
that the state statutes typically require an arbitrator to
consider the employer’s financial position and do not explicitly
exclude any criteria.105 The final-offer statutes of Wisconsin,
Maine, Michigan, and New Jersey, each discussed in Part II,
have a “financial position” requirement.106 Although financial
position considerations differ between team owners, other
private employers, and state municipalities, the policy
underlying the consideration of any employer’s financial
situation may enlighten our understanding of MLB’s explicit
exclusion of a team’s financial position. Additionally,
comparing a state statute’s list of criteria and the weight
given to each criterion will be helpful in determining how
criteria should be laid out in any final-offer agreement.
1. Maine
The Maine Agriculture Marketing and Bargaining Act lists
eleven factors that an arbitrator is required to consider, such
as “the producer’s costs of production including the cost that
would be involved in paying farm labor a fair wage rate” and
“the impact of the award on the competitive position of the
handler in the market area or competing market areas.”107
The Act does not outline what weight should be given to each
factor nor does it explicitly exclude any factors.108 A list of
eleven factors does not seem to help achieve the goals of final104. For example, Wisconsin requires a “comparison of wages, hours and conditions
of the municipal employees involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages,
hours and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar services.
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(D) (Lexis 2008). Michigan, New Jersey and Connecticut,
among others, also have comparability factors. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239(9)(d)
(Lexis 2008); N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(g)(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276a(e)(5) (2008).
105. Iowa requires a final-offer arbitrator to consider “the interests of the welfare of
the public, the ability of the employer to finance the economic adjustments and the
effect of such adjustments on the normal standard of services.” IOWA CODE ANN. §
20.22(9)(c). Maine, New Jersey, Connecticut, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Washington, Wisconsin and Michigan have similar requirements. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A);.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(g)(6) (2009). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5276a(e)(3) (Lexis 2008). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (Subd. 7) (Lexis 2008). OKLA.
STAT. ANN. TIT. § 51-108(4) (Lexis 2008), PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122-A (Lexis 2008),
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.21.779(2)(6) (Lexis 2009). WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(C)
(Lexis 2008). MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239(9)(C).
106. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g)(6); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (6)(C); MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. § 423.239(9)(c).
107. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A) (D), (F).
108. Id.

TULIS_FORMATTED

122

1/19/2010 3:45 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 20.1

offer arbitration. Perhaps Maine should reduce the number of
factors or require an arbitrator to explain the weight given to
each factor. Because the ultimate goal of final-offer
arbitration is settlement, it may follow that the arbitrators
should consider as few factors as possible because the parties
will be negotiating only as to those factors. If the parties are
required to consider a long list of factors, settlement may be
less likely. While it is possible that each of these eleven
factors is essential to Maine agricultural law, the theories
underlying final-offer arbitration suggest that only the
essential criteria be considered.
In discussing Maine’s criteria, it is important to remember
that the Act is unique in that it deals with the financial
position of “handlers” rather than municipalities. The clause
that requires arbitrators to consider the impact of an award
on the competitive position of the handler in the market is
interesting in light of MLB’s exclusion of a team’s financial
position. Like major league teams, handlers are in a
competitive market. Although MLB considers the individual
player market and a team’s competitiveness in terms of “on
the field” success for establishing a player’s market value, it
does not consider the competitive market as it relates to the
award or any future award’s potential impact on a team’s
financial competitiveness.
2. New Jersey
New Jersey’s Employer-Employee Relations Act lists nine
factors that an arbitrator may consider.109 The Act requires
that in a final-offer or conventional arbitration, the arbitrator
give “due weight to those factors. . .that are relevant for the
resolution of the specific dispute.”110 The statute also requires
that, in the award, an arbitrator indicate which factors are
relevant, satisfactorily explain why the others are irrelevant,
and provide an analysis of the evidence for each relevant
factor.”111
The financial position criterion in New Jersey’s statute has
been the subject of literature, case law, and legislative

109. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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proposals.112 Some critics have argued that the financial
position factor should be given more weight, and that
arbitrator discretion as to weight has led to incessant wage
increases New Jersey’s municipalities cannot afford.113 These
same critics attribute these wage increases to the
comparability factor. Thus, the argument is that the criteria
do not provide an accurate reflection of the market for lessaffluent municipalities. In 1992, various proposals in the New
Jersey Legislature unsuccessfully sought to control the wage
increases associated with the comparability factor by putting
greater emphasis on the state’s financial capacity.114
A separate question is the weight to be accorded to each
criterion. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, on multiple
occasions prior to 1995, found that arbitrators did not give
each criterion the correct weight and the legislature has made
attempts to address the issue. The court repeatedly
emphasized that each of the eight factors must be more
carefully evaluated.115 Increased judicial review is a risk
associated with requiring an arbitrator to outline the weight
given to each factor. However, especially in a final-offer
arbitration setting, such review may prevent excessive
arbitrator discretion and thereby help the parties predict an
arbitrator’s actions. The court also noted that merely
determining that a municipality has the financial capability
to meet the employees’ demands should not satisfy the
“financial impact” factor.116 An arbitrator is not limited to
simply determining whether the municipality can pay, but
may also focus on whether the municipality should pay given
the financial impact. Since most state statutes provide little
guidance as to the extent that a city’s financial position
should be a factor, the court’s interpretation is worth noting.
In 1995, New Jersey’s statute was amended to expand
upon the language of the “financial position” factor.117 The
112. See Martin, supra note 63. See also P.L. 1996, Chapter 425, 206th Leg., 2nd
Annual Sess. (N.J. 1995); Fox v. Morris County Policemen’s Ass’n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.
Super. 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Twp. of Washington v. N.J. State
Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Local 206, 137 N.J. 88 (1994). New Jersey requires that
an arbitrator take into account “the financial impact on the governing unit, its
residents and its taxpayers.” N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g).
113. See Martin, supra note 63, at 62.
114. 80 N.J. LEGIS. INDEX NO. 2, at A-836 (Feb. 9, 1993)
115. See Fox, supra note 112. See also Twp. of Washington, supra note 112.
116. See Twp. of Washington, supra note 112.
117. P.L. 1996, supra note 112.
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Legislature added language to clarify how the “financial
impact” should be analyzed.118 Although this language
undoubtedly gives the arbitrator clarification as to how to
apply the factor, it does not address concerns as to the weight
an arbitrator should apply to a municipality’s ability to pay.
Critics note that arbitrator awards are still too high and that
the legislature has not appropriately considered the limited
ability of municipalities to fund increases in pay.119
Overall, however, New Jersey’s willingness to clarify the
financial position factor is encouraging and may promote
settlement. The statute now allows less room for an
arbitrator’s interpretation. Before the amendment, parties
may have been less likely to agree on how a municipality’s
ability to pay should be applied in an arbitration proceeding.
As the factor is now more detailed, the arbitrator’s discretion
is limited, which may make the parties more likely to agree
on how the factor will be applied in arbitration. This
increased predictability should promote pre-hearing
settlement.
3. Michigan, Wisconsin, and Catch-All Factors
Michigan’s final-offer statute for firemen and policemen
requires that an arbitrator consider eight relatively vague
factors including “the interests of the public and the financial
118. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g). Prior to 1995, section (g)(6) read, “[t]he financial
impact on the governing unit, its residents and taxpayers.” The 1995 amendment added
the following language:
When considering this factor in a dispute in which the public employer is a
county or a municipality, the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators shall take into
account, to the extent that evidence is introduced, how the award will affect
the municipal or county purposes element, as the case may be, of the local
property tax; a comparison of the percentage of the municipal purposes
element or, in the case of a county, the county purposes element, required to
fund the employees’ contract in the proceeding local budget year with that
required under the award for the current local budget year; the impact of the
award for each income sector of the property taxpayers of the local unit; the
impact of the award on the ability of the governing body to (a) maintain
existing local programs and services, (b) expand existing local programs and
services for which public moneys have been designated by the governing body
in a proposed local budget, or (c) initiate any new programs and services for
which public moneys have been designated by the governing body in a
proposed local budget.
119. E-mail from Robert Martin, Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, to
Benjamin A. Tulis (March 2009) (on file with author). See also Martin, supra note 63.
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ability of the unit of government to meet these costs.”120 The
statute does not assign any particular weight to its eight
factors and notes that the panel should base its findings and
opinions on these factors only “if applicable.”121 The factors in
Michigan are guidelines rather than strict criteria, giving an
arbitrator greater discretion to decide the economic issues in
dispute. For the purposes of final-offer arbitration, it is better
to apply strict criteria so that the parties can agree on what
an arbitrator will consider and ultimately decide. Unlike New
Jersey’s final-offer statute, Michigan’s “financial position”
factor remains vague.122 The Court of Appeals of Michigan has
noted that while an arbitrator must consider a city’s financial
ability, a financial inability to pay does not automatically
mean that the city’s final offer will be selected.123 Greater
specificity in the factor could address this issue and would
allow the parties to agree on how an arbitrator would apply
the criterion. Instead, Michigan’s vague factor has led to
arbitration proceedings and judicial review.
Wisconsin’s final-offer statute lists eight factors, similar to
those listed in Michigan’s statute, including a requirement
that an arbitrator consider “the interests and the welfare of
the public and the financial ability of the unit of government
to meet these costs,” but it does not require that any specific
weight be given to any of the factors.124 The statute merely
states that the arbitrator shall “give weight” to the listed
factors.125
Both Michigan and Wisconsin’s final-offer statutes also
contain a residual, or catch-all factor, with identical language,
for the arbitrator to consider “such other factors, not confined
to the foregoing, which are normally or traditionally taken
into consideration in determining wages, hours and
employment through voluntary collective bargaining,
120. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239 (9)(c).
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239.
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239 (c). Michigan’s statute requires that an
arbitrator consider “the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of
the unit of government to meet these costs.” New Jersey, on the other hand, clarified
the vague nature of its statutory language, likely in response to litigation. Maine and
Wisconsin’s financial position factors are similar to Michigan’s. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A)(D); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(C),
123. Hamtramck v. Hamtramck Firefighters Ass’n, 128 Mich. App. 457 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983).
124. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(C).
125. Id.
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mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the
parties, in the public service or in private employment.”126
Maine’s final-offer statute includes a similar catch-all
factor.127 New Jersey’s statute, on the other hand, lacks a
catch-all factor.128
These residual factors give an arbitrator greater flexibility
to determine which final offer is most appropriate. For
example, the Third District Court of Appeals in Wisconsin
found that an arbitrator, who used the catch-all factor, did not
err in evaluating the final-offer proposals by speculating as to
the economic effect a new jail would have on the city’s
financial position in evaluating the final-offer proposals.129
The Wisconsin Professional Police Association argued that the
prospective economic impacts could not be characterized as
definite because they were unpredictable and could vary, but
the court allowed the arbitrator’s use of speculative
information under Wisconsin’s catch-all factor.130
How does the presence of these catch-all factors relate to
the theories of final-offer arbitration? Catch-all factors may
complicate negotiations. For example, if one party to a
negotiation makes an offer based on what it believes to be a
relevant factor under the catch-all, but the other party does
not agree with the relevance of this factor, the parties are less
likely to find a middle ground. If the parties must adhere to a
strict, finite list of criteria, however, they are more likely to be
in agreement during pre-hearing negotiations.
D. Conclusion
Each context utilizing final-offer arbitration may
require different criteria depending on the nature of the
parties and the respective market. There is no universal set of
criteria that can be applied to every final-offer setting.
However, the list of criteria in any agreement or state statute
126. Id. § (h).
127. Maine’s final-offer statute requires an arbitrator to consider “other factors
which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in determining prices,
quality, quantity and the costs of other services involved.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13
§ 1958-B(5-A) (K).
128. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(g).
129. Wisconsin Prof’l Police Ass’n v. Oneida County, 2001 WI App 58 (Wis. Ct. App.
2001). See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(H) (Lexis 2008).
130. Id. at *10.
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should be formulated to promote the underlying theories and
goals of final-offer arbitration.
1. When Should Factors Be Excluded?
Similar to the list of admissible criteria, the list of
inadmissible criteria in any agreement or statute will vary in
different contexts. For example, in their respective
proceedings, it is more important to consider a municipality’s
ability to pay than the financial position of a sports
organization. MLB has its own reasons for prohibiting an
arbitrator from considering a team’s ability to pay.131
Excluded factors, however, may also be utilized to promote
settlement. This may not be the reason behind the exclusion
in baseball. If a small-market baseball team were aware that
its financial position would be considered, it would be more
likely to try to win arbitration rather than settle. The team
could then trade a player if it lost the arbitration, in order to
save money. A municipality, on the other hand, does not have
the option to trade its firemen if the municipality loses
arbitration. An agreement could exclude factors in an effort to
promote pre-hearing settlement as long as the excluded factor
is not an essential criterion.
2. Weight Issues
Because every dispute varies, it is difficult to restrict an
arbitrator to a specific weight for each factor. Regardless,
clarification would further the theories of final-offer
arbitration. Clarification can come in the form of prioritizing
the most important factors or highlighting those factors that
typically receive more weight. The more information the
parties possess as to how an arbitrator will decide, the more
likely they are to find a middle ground.
Clarifying the weight of each factor would be especially
beneficial for conflicting factors. For example, MLB could note
that a player’s performance over the course of his career is
more important than his performance in the most recent
season. However, the specific order in which the factors are
131. This exclusion is likely a result of a collective bargaining agreement being
constructed between the Players’ Association, big-market owners, and small-market
owners. The big-market owners and small-market owners split the owners’ vote, while
the Players’ Association prefers that a team’s financial position be excluded.
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prioritized is irrelevant. All that matters is that the parties
are aware of how an arbitrator will view the factor and, as a
result, have one less factor to interpret allowing the parties to
avoid pre-hearing disagreement. Another weight issue
surrounding conflicting factors is a municipality’s ability to
pay weighed against the wages of comparable workers in
other municipalities. A statute could indicate how to weigh
these factors. For example, a statute could require an
arbitrator to prioritize a municipality’s ability to pay the
wages of comparable employees in comparable municipalities
if the cited municipalities have greater financial resources
than the negotiating municipality.
Another option is New Jersey’s requirement that an
arbitrator discuss, in his decision, how much weight was
given to each relevant factor. This would allow the parties in
subsequent arbitrations to predict how that arbitrator will
weigh a given factor by analyzing past analogous arbitrations.
Since the parties would be able to better predict how the
arbitrator might decide, they would be more likely to find a
middle ground – at least if the arbitrator were identified in
advance. Two risks are associated with written decisions in
final-offer arbitration. First, these decisions are not always
consistent. The arbitrator often attempts to be fair and not
offend either party, resulting in decisions that may simply
pay lip service to the criteria. Having parties rely on such
decisions may be dangerous and there is no guarantee that
parties will gain a greater understanding of how the
arbitrator will adjudicate. The other risk of allowing
arbitrator discussion, however, is that it increases the
potential for judicial review, thus reducing the efficiency and
finality of the process. New Jersey public employment
arbitrations, presumably because of this discussion
requirement, have been the subject of greater judicial review
than those of Wisconsin and Michigan.
3. How Extensive and Detailed Should Criteria Be?
The ideal list of criteria in final-offer arbitration is short
and very detailed. Although a state may find twenty factors to
be absolutely essential for mimicking the market, final-offer
arbitration typically works best when parties negotiate based
on a short list of factors. Additionally, regardless of how many
factors are included in the statute or agreement, each factor
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should be as detailed as possible to limit arbitrator discretion
so that the parties can more easily predict the outcome of an
arbitration proceeding. Many factors in both state statutes
and MLB’s collective bargaining agreement are relatively
vague. Ambiguous factors are left open to interpretation by
the arbitrator and, more importantly, by the negotiating
parties. Each negotiating party will interpret a vague factor
in their favor, which could “chill” negotiations.
For example, in MLB, there is little guidance as to how to
apply the comparability factor. While MLB salary arbitration
is effective in reaching pre-hearing settlement, the resulting
salaries may be skewed by the criteria in the collective
bargaining agreement. I propose a formula based on MLB’s
salary comparability factor that would provide greater
specificity and understanding among the parties prior to
arbitration.132 The formula determines a player’s market
value based on the player’s position, performance, and other
factors. If the parties knew that an arbitrator would take this
“market value” into account, this knowledge could further
negotiations. The formula is an example of the benefits of
greater specificity, which, in any form, would lead to a better
understanding between the parties and, in turn, direct the
parties toward the final-offer goal of pre-hearing settlement.
Greater specificity would function in a fashion similar to New
Jersey’s 1995 clarification of the “financial” position factor.
132. The formula standardizes each factor by providing constants based on the
“superstar” statistics of a player in a given six hundred at bats. “Superstar” statistics
were the league leaders in any given category spread out over 600 at bats. For hitters,
the factors included are hits, home runs, total bases, RBI’s, stolen bases, runs, walks,
time on the disabled list, team wins, errors (at the player’s position), Stolen Bases
allowed (for catchers), caught stealing (for catchers, the formula also included other
position specific categories such as outfield assists), experience, and other factors.
(There are obviously different factors for starting pitchers and relief pitchers).
One side of the formula included the constants and the statistics of
“comparable” players spread out to six hundred at bats while the other side of the
formula included the constants and the statistics of the arbitration eligible player
spread out to six hundred at bats (Note: six hundred at bats is the standard for hitters.
There are different (innings-related) standards for starting pitchers and relief pitchers).
Both of these are put in the denominator while the comparable player’s salary is put in
the numerator and the arbitration eligible player’s market value, X, is placed in the
other numerator. This allows you to compare the value of the player going through
arbitration with any “comparable” player a party chooses to utilize. Of course, MLB
salary arbitration is a successful example of final-offer arbitration but there is always
room for improvement. I may discuss the formula more thoroughly in an upcoming
article.
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Michigan, Maine, and Wisconsin, on the other hand, have left
their financial position language vague, much like New
Jersey’s pre-1995 language. Greater specificity for this
criterion, and all criteria for that matter, would better
facilitate good faith bargaining.
Along the same lines, catch-all factors such as those
included in Michigan, Maine, and Wisconsin’s statutes most
likely do not suit the goals of final-offer arbitration. In
negotiations, parties may attempt to stretch the reach of a
catch-all definition to a point where the parties disagree as to
what is relevant. To avoid this scenario, an arbitrator should
be restricted to a set number of criteria.
Criteria should be as clear as possible to facilitate prehearing negotiations while reflecting the sought-after market.
It is most important that criteria be detailed in such a
manner that the parties have a mutual understanding as to
how a given criterion will be applied prior to the hearing. If
possible, a list of criteria should be limited, detailed, and
include some mechanism for apportioning the weight of
conflicting factors.
CONCLUSION
When applied appropriately, final-offer arbitration can be
a useful tool for facilitating pre-hearing settlement. In
addition to MLB and public employment, there are various
contexts that could benefit from the process, including private
value disputes and interest arbitrations under the proposed
Employee Free Choice Act. Within these contexts, any
agreement to arbitrate can be implemented in such a way as
to promote the theories behind final-offer arbitration, most
importantly by counteracting the “chilled” bargaining effect
associated with conventional arbitration. Outlining a suitable
set of criteria and choosing the appropriate procedural
variation may ensure proper implementation. Although finaloffer arbitration appears to be underutilized and, at times,
misused, if applied properly in an appropriate context, it can
be a valuable alternative to conventional arbitration and
provide a more efficient, congenial and cost-effective
arbitration process.

